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ABSTRACT 
Kyle Alexander Beaulieu: The Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict:  
Critical Factors Shaping the Present Stalemate  
(Under the direction of Milada Anna Vachudova) 
 
On August 7th, 2008, Georgia attempted to militarily reassert control over South 
Ossetia, one of its separatist republics, thus provoking a massive Russian invasion and 
Georgia’s rapid defeat. Russia used the opportunity provided by the Georgian provocation 
to consolidate its hold over Georgia’s two breakaway regions, ultimately recognizing them 
as legitimate, sovereign states, and thus increasing its power and influence in the region. 
The West was left reeling, unable to stop Russia or persuade the separatist republics to 
reconsider federation; the conflict in Georgia has shelved any hopes of a peaceful solution 
that respected Georgia’s “territorial integrity.” 
This conflict was neither random nor inevitable; rather, this thesis will argue that it 
was the result of a history of oppression by both Georgian and Abkhaz of the other, weak 
and corrupt states in Georgia and Abkhazia, the purposeful Russian destabilization of the 
region, and a significant refugee and demographic problem. This thesis will examine the 
impact that these factors have had on shaping the conflict situation, and it will seek to gain a 
better understanding of this suddenly unfrozen conflict, in the hope of successfully dealing 
with other conflicts in the former Soviet sphere before they erupt into war. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE 
Introduction 
A sprawling range of mountains sandwiched between two inland seas, the Caucasus 
is once again the scene of an international power struggle. Where once Alexander the Great 
fought the Persian Empire, and where Imperial Russia clashed with the Ottoman Turks, 
today’s conflict features questions of geopolitical influence between Russia and the 
transatlantic alliance. The small nation of Georgia is the pivot around which this conflict 
revolves, and instrumental to the conflict in Georgia is the separatist republic of Abkhazia. 
Georgia, newly independent as a result of the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, continues to grapple with profound questions of territorial integrity, identity, 
democracy, ethnic unrest, poverty, and corruption. The separatist republic of Abkhazia 
attempted to secede from Georgia in 1992, provoking a war with Georgia that resulted in 
Georgian retreat, de facto independence for Abkhazia, and a highly influential role for 
Russia. For the next ten years, Georgia endured a bloody coup, a civil war, and a strong-arm 
president in the form of Eduard Shevardnadze. Nevertheless, Georgia has made remarkable 
progress towards democracy following its 2003 Rose Revolution, and its President 
Saakashvili enjoys warm relations with a number of Western leaders.  
However, an increasingly hostile relationship with its northern neighbor, Russia, and 
a history of distrust between the Georgian state and its two separatist territories, finally 
culminated in war in August, 2008. Georgia’s military incursion into South Ossetia 
provoked a massive Russian counterattack, resulting in Georgian defeat and Russian 
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diplomatic recognition of both of Georgia’s separatist republics. Although the war lasted 
less than ten days, in that time tremendous damage was done not only to Georgian 
infrastructure, but also to any possibility of reintegrating the de facto independent republics 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the near future. 
Working towards, let alone finding, a solution to the conflict is complicated by 
visceral distrust on all sides, by accusations of racism and attempted genocide, by a fear of 
revenge policies should Georgia regain control of the separatist republics, and by Western 
recognition of an independent Kosovo in February, 2008.  
Thus a stalemate now exists across the Caucasus. Russian troops have withdrawn 
back into the separatist republics, and a badly beaten Georgian army eyes them warily. The 
murders of a Georgian mayor, Russian soldiers, and Georgian policemen are typical. 
Georgia has sued Russia in the International Court of Justice. The last vital bridge linking 
Abkhazia with Georgia (across treacherous geography) was bombed. Georgia has begun to 
construct emergency housing for the thousands of ethnic Georgians expelled from the 
republics, as winter is approaching quickly. This bloody status quo will limp on indefinitely 
until trust is rebuilt on both the Abkhazian and Georgian sides. 
The main question I will address in this thesis is quite simply, “how did we get 
here?” There was a great deal of surprise among many in the international community upon 
the outbreak of violence in August. I think such a perspective is naïve; with all the volatile 
ingredients present in the region, the recipe for war was drawn up long ago. I will address 
the factors that have led to a situation where the transatlantic alliance appears to have 
practically no leverage whatsoever, aside from providing Georgia with a staggering $4.5 
billion in aid.  
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Thesis statement 
This thesis will argue that the August war was essentially inevitable, and the present 
situation has arisen due to three contributing factors: Russian hegemony; ethnic tensions 
between Georgians and minority ethnic groups; and Western ambivalence. Once war finally 
broke out, it was far too late for the West to intervene. With no legitimacy in the separatist 
republics and no leverage over Russia, the West could do little but pontificate and await 
Russia’s pleasure. 
Outline 
In order to make this argument, the body of this thesis consists of five chapters that 
address the factors I have just outlined. Chapter 1 gives a concise background and addresses 
the history and development of the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia especially in 
regards to Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.  
Chapter 2 examines the democratic institutions of Georgia and Abkhazia, and looks 
to the region for a sense of context. This chapter explains the contribution of weak central 
states to the outbreak of war. 
Chapter 3 articulates the main factor presently shaping the outcome in Abkhazia: 
Russia. Russia has demonstrated conclusively in the past several months its desire to 
reassert control in its ‘near abroad.’ I will argue that Russia, through meddling, interference, 
coercion, and outright military action, has dispelled the illusion that it respects the 
sovereignty of its neighbors. 
Chapter 4 tackles the ethnic tensions that exist between Georgia and its non-
Georgian elements, especially in regards to the territory of Abkhazia and the refugee 
question. The history of tension between Georgians and Abkhaz, as well as the hundreds of 
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thousands of ethnic Georgian refugees expelled from Abkhazia at the conclusion of the 
1992-93 war, shape the situation today, are fundamental in shaping the current conflict. 
Georgia once resembled the former Yugoslavia’s patchwork of ethnic diversity, but is now 
trending towards a more modern Balkan outcome: ethnically homogenous units divided by 
ethnic cleansing and war. 
Chapter 5 addresses the August 2008 war by explaining how the various parties 
view the conflict, and what points are still in contention. I will argue that the conflict did 
not, in fact, begin on August 7th, but rather Russia had been steadily escalating pressure for 
several months beforehand.  
The thesis concludes by explaining how these factors shaped where we are today in 
Abkhazia, and that Russia’s leverage appears uncontestable within this specific conflict. 
However, I will argue that although Russia’s position has been strengthened vis-à-vis 
Georgia’s, I contend that Russia has in fact lost influence in its near abroad due to its lack of 
a coherent foreign policy. 
A few clarifications need to be made before continuing. First, the use of “Russia” 
throughout this thesis refers to the Russian government and political elite, just as the use of 
“Georgia” or “Abkhazia” signify the respective institutions. On the other hand, the use of 
“the West” is less clear; for example, the United States and Germany tend to approach 
conflicts of this nature differently. When referring to “the West” I refer to the transatlantic 
alliance, and the principal partners in that alliance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, until very 
recently the approaches taken to this conflict have been relatively uniform across the 
spectrum of the transatlantic alliance, which is to say disengaged and lethargic. 
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This thesis focuses on Georgia’s relationship with its breakaway republic of 
Abkhazia. My reasons for focusing on Abkhazia rather than addressing both separatist 
republics are several, aside from simple space constraints. The conflict in Abkhazia begs 
further study because of a number of interesting factors: first, Abkhazia and Georgia have a 
long history of jostling with one another while under the yoke of imperial overlords. 
Second, even with such a small population (190-225,000), Abkhazia still dwarfs the 
republic of South Ossetia, which is little more than a patchwork of Georgian, Ossetian, and 
mixed villages (total population, between 50-75,000), and thus it provides a better 
comparison to other separatist situations. Lastly, in addition to a reasonably functioning 
state and a history of relative tolerance towards most of its own ethnic minorities, Abkhazia 
has the capacity to be an economically prosperous state, due to its history as a vibrant tourist 
destination and productive citrus agriculture. South Ossetia lacks such an infrastructure and 
would be hopelessly dependent on outside aid if it truly achieved independence. With such 
factors in mind, I will focus on the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict relationship, to the exclusion 
of South Ossetia. 
This thesis, in addressing the factors that have shaped the current situation, seeks to 
enlighten the conversation surrounding the all too simplified rhetoric that this conflict has 
produced among politicians and the media. Statements like “We are all Georgians,”1 made 
by Republican Senator John McCain, serve to inflame tensions in an already conflict-prone 
area. Understanding both perspectives on Abkhazia’s future is fundamental, because while 
Georgia may view Russia’s actions as an aggressive land-grab, Russia may view Georgia’s 
relationship with Abkhazia as territorial aggrandizement. Based on my research into the 
                                                 
1
 Falcone, Michael. New York Times Online. August 15th 2008 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E7D8153EF936A2575BC0A96E9C8B63&scp=1&sq=
%22we+are+all+georgians%22&st=nyt> 
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historical, situational, and political background of the conflict in Abkhazia, I will conclude 
that the Abkhazia question will only be solved by understanding how the three critical 
contributing factors: Russian hegemony, ethnic conflict, and Western inactivity, have led to 
the unfortunate stalemate that exists today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
PAST AS PROLOGUE: HISTORY OF THE GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA CONFLICT  
This chapter will examine the background to the conflict in order to better 
understand the historical relationships between the various parties. The saying “past is 
prologue” is fitting for this conflict, because much of the conflict revolves around Abkhaz 
resentment of Georgian domination, Georgian resentment of Russian domination, Russia’s 
dominant role in the Caucasus, and the inner political machinations that have shaped the 
present situation. This chapter forms the basis for later chapters, but it also articulates the 
past as a contributing factor in its own right. Georgia’s problems with Abkhazia are 
centuries old, and the conflict today is much the same as it was in 1925; two peoples, 
neither of whom have any other home on Earth, jockeying for power on a small strip of 
mountainous terrain. Such a history of contention contributes greatly to the present 
stalemate. 
The history of the Caucasus is one of repeated conquests by foreign superpowers. 
The Abkhaz and Georgian people have alternated back and forth between ruling each other 
and being ruled by a host of empires. Both cultures have repeatedly sought home rule in the 
face of these repeated conquests.2 The Abkhaz people in antiquity were ruled by a steady 
succession of foreign powers: the Georgian Kingdom of Colchis, then the Kingdom of 
Egrisi, then the Roman Empire, then a brief period of semi-autonomy before being absorbed 
                                                 
2
 Goltz 19 
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by the Byzantine Empire around the 5th century A.D.3 Christianity trickled in gradually, but 
it was introduced as the official religion in the 6th century. In the 780s, the Abkhaz king 
Leon II liberated the country from Byzantine rule and ruled over a united western Georgia, 
proclaiming the Kingdom of Abkhazia.4 
In the second half of the tenth century, Abkhazia became part of feudal Georgia. 
With the decline of this feudal kingdom, Abkhazia broke free around the turn of the 16th 
century to become an independent principality. By the second half of the 16th century, 
Abkhazia, along with all of western Georgia, fell to the Ottoman Empire. The vast majority 
of Abkhaz converted to Islam while most Georgians preserved their Orthodox Christian 
heritage.5 
Abkhazia first came under the dominion of Imperial Russia in 1810, as a separate 
territory from Georgia. Abkhazia administered its own affairs until 1864, when Imperial 
Russia finally defeated the last of the Caucasian mountain peoples and annexed most of the 
Caucasus to the Russian Empire.6 The Tsar reorganized the region into the Sukhumi 
Military District. Many Abkhazians refused to accept Imperial rule, and thus the majority 
were exiled into Ottoman lands in 1877, leaving the northwest Caucasus decimated of its 
native population. Abkhazian deportations to Ottoman Turkey continued throughout 1878, 
following the Russo-Turkish war.7 By 1886, out of a population of almost 70,000, and after 
numerous deportations, the ethnic percentages in Abkhazia looked like: Abkhaz 85%; 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. 19-20 
 
4
 Ibid. 20-21 
 
5
 Ibid. 24-25 
 
6
 Normark 92 
 
7
 Goltz 30-31 
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Mingrelians 5%; Greeks 3%; Armenians 1%; Russian 1%, Estonians <1%; Georgians <1% 
and Others 1%.8 
In November 1917, the local cadres of the Menshevik Transcaucasian Commissariat 
took power in Abkhazia. In March 1918, under Bolshevik leadership, an armed uprising 
was instituted, with, on April 8th, the taking of Sukhumi and proclamation of Soviet power. 
However, the Soviet commune of Abkhazia lasted only 40 days before it was annexed by 
Georgian Mensheviks, on May 17th, 1918.9 The Soviet Union did not reestablish power until 
1921, with the formation of the Abkhazian Soviet Republic, subsequently recognized by 
Georgia’s revolutionary committee on May 21st. A “contract of alliance” was signed by 
Abkhazia and Georgia in early 1921. Abkhazia and Georgia, together, entered the 
Transcaucasian Federation in 1922, and as part of the Transcaucasian Federation, Abkhazia 
joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a few weeks later.10 On April 1st, 1925, the 
Abkhazian Constitution was adopted, legally guaranteeing its republican status as a part, 
and partner, of Georgia.11 
Abkhazia suffered greatly under Joseph Stalin (an ethnic Georgian) during the 
1930s, as tens of thousands of suspected enemies of the people were arrested, convicted in 
kangaroo courts, and executed.12 In 1931 Abkhazia was reduced to that of an autonomous 
republic within Georgia; thus moving the power center closer to Tbilisi. In 1937, the brutal 
head of the Georgian Communist Party, Lavrenti Beria, initiated a forced colonization by 
                                                 
8
 Conciliation Resources Online, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/chronology.php> 
 
9
 Normark 92 
 
10
 de Waal, 310-311 
 
11
 Ibid. 
 
12
 Goltz 36 
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thousands of non-Abkhazian, predominantly Georgian, working poor into Abkhazia.13 Beria 
took a far more active role in the Caucasus than Stalin had, by creating cadres, informant 
networks, and ensuring strict adherence to the party line.14 Under Beria, the Abkhaz 
alphabet was converted into a Georgian script, and in 1944-1945 all Abkhazian schools 
were closed and replaced with Georgian schools, that amounted to little more than 
indoctrination centers. Beria’s Bolshevist attempt to Georgianify, and thus Russify, the 
Abkhazian people led to the banning of the language from administration and publication.15 
Only in 1953, after Stalin had died and Beria had been denounced and executed, 
were the Abkhaz allowed to reassert some of their repressed cultural identity. A new script, 
based on Cyrillic, was devised; Abkhazian schools reopened; political administration was 
returned partially to Abkhazian control. Ethnic Abkhaz were even allowed over-
representation in local offices in compensation for the cultural repression.16 
The resulting three decades were relatively uneventful, as Georgia and Abkhazia 
were essentially closed off from the rest of the world outside the Soviet Union. Abkhazia, 
however, was an extremely popular tourist destination within the Union, which helps 
explain the affinity for Abkhazia that many Russians feel.17 
In 1978, 130 Abkhazian intellectuals, exhausted by the cultural oppression, wrote to 
Brezhnev to request permission for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and become part of 
Russia. Their request was denied, however, and all the signatories lost their jobs. Shortly 
                                                 
13
 Pelkmans 104-5 
 
14
 Goltz 39 
 
15
 Ibid. 35-37 
 
16
 Ibid. 36 
 
17
 Goltz 57 
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thereafter the Abkhazian State University was opened in Sukhumi (with Georgian, Russian 
and Abkhazian branches) as the first place of higher education in western Georgia. There 
was a second petition ten years later, this time signed by 60 prominent Abkhazians. The 
petition detailed in 87 pages a list of complaints of how Abkhazia was being Georgia-fied 
by both Tbilisi and the substantial Georgian colonists in Abkhazia.18 The petition called for 
restoring Abkhazia’s Union Republic status of the 1920s, alongside special treaty ties with 
Georgia, and thus a total renegotiation of the political framework.19 
On March 18th, 1989, 30,000 people signed a petition at a mass meeting in 
Abkhazia, demanding the restoration of the sovereign status Abkhazia enjoyed before 1931. 
Georgia’s official reaction was hostile and a number of measures were taken to consolidate 
Georgian power and influence in Abkhazia. Principal among these was the decision to open 
a branch of Tbilisi State University in Abkhazia’s capital Sukhumi. This was aimed at 
undermining the official university, established in 1978. Ethnic clashes between students 
broke out, and these spread to the wider community in Sukhumi in July 1989.20 
As the Soviet Union began to fracture, nationalist sentiment skyrocketed in Georgia 
alongside hopes for independence from two centuries of Russian domination. A State 
Program for the Georgian language was published in November 1988 and was adopted by 
the Georgian Supreme Soviet in August 1989.21 The law, which made the teaching of the 
Georgian language obligatory in all schools, and which required Georgian language and 
                                                 
18
 Conciliation Resources Online, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/chronology.php> 
October 24th, 2008 
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 Akaba 85-86 
 
20
 Lynch 129 
 
21
 Dale 122 
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literature tests as prerequisites for entry into higher education, raised fears of a renewed 
attempt at Georgianization among Abkhazians.22 
In August, 1990, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet, in the absence of its Georgian 
deputies, declared the state sovereignty of the Abkhazian SSR. However, the Abkhazian 
Supreme Soviet emphasized its willingness to negotiate with the Georgian government with 
the objective being preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity.23 The following day the 
Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR declared the decision invalid. In December 1990 the 
Abkhazian Supreme Soviet elected historian Vladislav Ardzimba as its Chairman; he would 
govern Abkhazia for the next thirteen years.24 
A major catalyst of tensions between Abkhazia and Georgia was the March 17th, 
1991 USSR-wide referendum on Gorbachev’s Union Treaty.25 While Georgia boycotted the 
vote, Abkhazia’s non-Georgian population voted overwhelmingly, with 98.6% in favor, to 
enter the proposed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. By participating, Abkhazia had 
effectively separated itself from Georgia’s bid for independence. 
In negotiations with the Georgian government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a virulent 
Georgian nationalist,26 Abkhazian leaders proposed a two-chamber parliament for 
Abkhazia. One chamber would represent the entire electorate on the basis of proportional 
representation; the other would represent the various ethnic groups that constituted 
                                                 
22
 Goltz 120-122 
 
23
 Ibid. 123 
 
24
 Ibid. 61-63 
 
25
 Clines, Francis X. New York Times Online, July 25th, 1991 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE4DF1438F936A15754C0A967958260&scp=10&sq=
gorbachev%20union%20treaty%20&st=cse> 
 
26
 Zürcher 102 
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Abkhazia. After protracted negotiations, the Abkhazian leaders agreed to a new election law 
in Abkhazia which allocated set numbers of parliament seats to each ethnic group. Of the 65 
seats, 28 were reserved for Abkhazians, 26 for Georgians, and 11 for other nationalities. As 
an additional measure of protection for each of the minority groups, certain decisions were 
to be taken only with a qualified majority of 75%. In December 1991, a new parliament 
(though technically still a Supreme Soviet) was elected under this regime.27 
Unfortunately, within months the parliament was deadlocked, divided along ethnic 
lines: Georgian MPs on one side, and Abkhazian, Armenian, Greek, Russian, and other 
minority MPs on the other. Decisions taken by a majority were repeatedly rejected by 
Georgian MPs. This led to a walk-out, in June, 1992, the Georgians, who began meeting in 
separate quarters. 
In February 1992, following the overthrow of Georgian President Gamsakhurdia in a 
bloody coup, the Georgian Military Council reinstated Georgia’s 1921, pre-Bolshevik, 
constitution. In June of that year, Abkhazian President Vladislav Ardzinba sent a draft treaty 
to the Georgian State Council essentially calling for the creation of a confederative 
relationship between Abkhazia and Georgia, while preserving Georgian territorial integrity. 
The draft contained provisions for the guarantee of rights to all minorities in the territories 
under Abkhazian and Georgian jurisdiction, and for the rejection of the use of military force 
to resolve disagreements. However, the State Council of Georgia did not give a response.28 
Consequently, because no formal status was assigned to Abkhazia under the 1921 
Georgian Constitution, in July 1992, Abkhazia reinstated its former constitution of 1925. 
According to Article 4 of the 1925 constitution, Abkhazia was “united with the Soviet 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. p 95. 
 
28
 Haindrava 205-206 
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Socialist Republic of Georgia on the basis of a special union-treaty.” The 1925 Abkhazian 
Constitution provided for a federal relationship between the “two equal republics” of 
Abkhazia and Georgia. The Georgian Parliament immediately annulled the Abkhazian 
decision.29 
In August, 1992, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet, again, sent an appeal to Eduard 
Shevardnadze (by now Chairman of the Georgian State Council) for negotiations on future 
federative relations between Abkhazia and Georgia. In the appeal, the Abkhazian leadership 
proposed that discussions should address both the extent of powers and responsibilities of 
separate Abkhazian and Georgian governments, and future joint (i.e. federal) bodies. 
However, these negotiations were overshadowed by the continuing civil war in Georgia. 
Supporters of Gamsakhurdia fought the Georgian government cabal, a four member 
Presidium of the State Council that featured Shevardnadze, two warlords named Kitovani 
and Ioseliani, and a Prime Minister by the name of Sigua, who was a backer of Kitovani.30 
Consultations between senior leaders of Abkhazia and Georgia continued, but were 
broken up, on August 14th, 1992 when Shevardnadze sent units of the Georgian National 
Guard into the region. The Georgian government claims that the Georgian troops entered 
Abkhazia in order to rescue hostages and to guard highways and railways, but since they 
met resistance from the Abkhaz militias, which they considered illegally armed brigands, it 
was logical for the government to try and suppress such an insurgency. 31 
The situation in Western Georgia along highways and railways truly was disastrous, 
owing to subversive activities by pro-Gamsakhurdia guerillas, and thus there was a 
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 Zürcher 93-95 
 
30
 Goltz 65-68 
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compelling pretext for increased Georgian military deployment in the region. In any case, 
the Georgian National Guard quickly escalated from hunting supporters of Gamsakhurdia to 
a campaign of pillage32 to an outright war on Abkhaz separatists. This was confirmed a few 
days later, when the Georgian Defense Minister, Tengiz Kitovani, claimed that the reason 
behind the military operation was to put a stop to the secessionist Abkhazian administration 
of Vladislav Ardzinba.33 
On August 14, 1992, the Georgian National Guard occupied Sukhumi, igniting the 
long-simmering Abkhazian conflict. The Abkhazians, shored up by volunteers from the 
northern Caucasus as well as Russian forces and weapons, rapidly organized a far more 
effective resistance than the Georgians were prepared for. Meanwhile, Gamsakhurdia’s 
forces in western Georgian were waging their own campaign. The Georgian National Guard 
faced a war on two fronts; Abkhazian and Caucasian forces to the north, and 
Gamsakhurdia’s faction to the south. A year later the Georgian National Guard was finally 
forced out of Sukhumi by the Abkhazians, just as the National Guard was being bullied by 
Gamsakhurdia. 34 
Shevardnadze was forced to appeal to Russia for military assistance in quelling 
Gamsakhurdia’s rebellion. In less than two weeks, Russian troops defeated Gamsakhurdia’s 
forces. As compensation, Shevardnadze was forced to end Georgia’s boycott and join the 
Russian-dominated (in his view) Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as sign of 
number of security cooperation agreements. Georgia’s indebtedness to Russia increased 
throughout early 1994, first signing a Russian-brokered ceasefire with the Abkhazians, and 
                                                 
32
 Zürcher 127-145 
 
33
 Goltz 65 
 
34
 Ibid. 52-53 
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then agreeing, along with Abkhazia, to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers along the 
border between Abkhazia and Georgia.35 
The interim 16 years between the ceasefire and the August 2008 war witnessed a 
thaw in tensions in the late 1990s, with increased dialogue and relative calm between 
Georgia and Abkhazia, until the regional dynamic was substantially changed following the 
2001 election of Vladimir Putin as the Russian President. However, chapter 3 will deal 
more thoroughly with Russia’s contemporary role in this conflict, just as chapter 4 will 
examine the demographic aftermath of the 1992-1993 Georgia-Abkhazia war.  
This section has attempted to explain the history of the complex, bloody rivalry 
between the Abkhaz and Georgian people, especially under Russian domination of almost 
two hundred years. With an understanding of this history in mind, we may conclude that 
such a rivalry over the course of generations doubtless contributes to the present situation. 
We shall now examine the region as a whole for a sense of context, as well as Georgia’s 
peaceful Rose Revolution of 2003, which ushered President Mikheil Saakashvili into power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
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CHAPTER 2 
STATE WEAKNESS AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR 
It is vital to understand the state of freedom and the strength of democratic 
institutions in Georgia and Abkhazia for a host of reasons. The scarcely democratic histories 
of both republics do not lend themselves to compromise or consensus-based solutions to 
conflict. In fact, Barbara Christophe argues that one of the primary failures of Georgia in the 
early 1990s was that they were never able to replace the well-entrenched patronage 
networks based on personal trust with a more modern, impersonal state bureaucracy, and 
that failure was one of the major factors in preventing a more democratic solution to the 
Abkhazia question.36I would argue that the lack of a culture of democracy, party 
competition, and negotiation leads to a situation in which the two republics are less inclined 
to trust one another and indeed their many differences are amplified rather than ameliorated.  
I will now outline the general state of freedom and democracy in Georgia and 
Abkhazia, in order to understand the institutional context in which this conflict takes place. 
I will do this by examining “country reports” and “nations in transit” analyses from 
Freedom House. Freedom House37 is a highly respected nongovernmental organization; it is 
one of the most prominent NGOs dealing with democracy promotion and campaigns for 
human rights. Freedom House is particularly known for its analyses and reports on the state 
of freedom around the world, and thus it is an essential source for any discussion involving 
democratic institutions in a given country. 
                                                 
36
 Christophe 193-207. 
 
37
 Freedom House Online <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1> October 29th, 2008 
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Georgia 
The figure below is taken from Freedom House’s 2008 Nations in Transit profile of 
Georgia,38 edited by Ghia Nodia, a noted and accomplished Georgian scholar, author, and 
political scientist. This figure gives the Freedom House scores for a range of government 
and democratic institutions within Georgia, indicating the degree to which Georgia is 
succeeding, or failing to succeed, in the implementation of liberal democracy.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=452&year=2008> October 20th, 2008. 
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As is clear from a cursory glance at the table, despite the supposed democratization 
of Georgia, especially in light of the Rose Revolution, Georgia has made relatively little 
progress over the past ten years, and indeed, has slipped slightly in several categories. Why 
is it then that the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe remarked in September 2007, “In a remarkably short time, Georgia has made 
stunning progress in carrying out substantial economic, judicial, and state reforms. It has 
laid the foundations that should allow Georgia to become a prosperous liberal market 
economy and a fully fledged democracy governed by human rights and the rule of law.”39  
There are two reasons for the discrepancy between the numbers and this 
encouraging evaluation of Georgian progress towards democracy. The first is that the Rose 
Revolution dramatically altered conditions in Georgia. Indeed, the Rose Revolution even 
helped trigger the other “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.40 The revolution 
refers to the peaceful resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze following massive 
protests over rigged parliamentary elections in November, 2003. The revolution ushered 
into power a group of young, pro-Western reformers led by the charismatic Mikheil 
Saakashvili. Although he was inexperienced and faced opposition within parliament, 
Saakashvili has had substantial success in rooting out mass corruption, strengthening public 
institutions, and promoting robust economic growth. 41 
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The second reason is best illustrated by Freedom House’s “map of freedom”42 
depicting the region: 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simply put, Georgia’s success in democratization stands in marked contrast with its 
former Soviet neighborhood. On this map, green represents “free,” yellow represents “partly 
free,” and blue represents “not free.” Of the entire former Soviet Union, only Ukraine, aside 
from the small Baltic states, has managed to achieve a “free” rating from Freedom House. 
What this means is that Georgia’s efforts towards democratization are successful in their 
own right, especially considering Russian efforts to reassert influence in its Near Abroad. 
Within its region, Georgia is best compared to Armenia: a small, Eastern Orthodox country 
in a geostrategic location with a long history of Russian domination. The ratings Freedom 
House assigns Armenia are almost identical to those Georgia receives.43 Contrast this status 
with oil-rich Azerbaijan’s rating of “not free,” or Turkey’s of “partly free,” although Turkey 
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enjoys a better evaluation from Freedom House than either of the former Soviet republics. 
This contrast illuminates an unsurprising pattern: the closer a regime is to Russia, the more 
likely that regime is to be rated as “not free.” Thus, because of their closer orbits with 
Russia, states like Azerbaijan, Belarus, and virtually all of the –stans are “not free.” 
Georgia's hybrid political system guarantees major political and civil rights and 
provides for pluralism institutionally, along with a free press. There is an unhealthy degree 
of dominance by the executive branch of the legislative and judicial branches, along with 
other state agencies, as well. In addition, the opposition movement is weak, thus preventing 
Georgia from achieving the status of a truly free, consolidated democracy. Ghia Nodia 
observes that “The effectiveness of the government has increased considerably since the 
Rose Revolution, especially in attracting public revenue and providing public goods. 
However, the fact that opposition protests led to a political crisis ending in a nine-day state 
of emergency exposed the vulnerability of Georgia's democratic institutions.”44 In early 
2007, President Saakashvili made the controversial claim that the existing Georgian 
“Constitution requires fundamental improvements in terms of democratization” and he then 
expressed an intention “to create a new constitutional commission to write a new Georgian 
Constitution in the coming years.” 45 
He soon recanted, claiming that any new constitution must await the conclusion of 
separatist disputes and the complete territorial integrity of Georgia. Although immensely 
popular among many Georgians, as well as in the capitals of the West, Saakashvili is 
considered by many analysts and members of the opposition to have somewhat autocratic 
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tendencies.46 During the protests in November, 2007, that Nodia spoke of, the opposition 
used the slogan “Georgia Without a President,” implying the introduction of a European-
style parliamentary democracy upon Saakashvili’s ouster. 
On the other hand, Georgia’s post-Rose Revolution leadership has made strides 
towards consolidating political power in Tbilisi at the cost of alienating the separatist 
regimes further than they were under Shevardnadze.47 Continuing in this vein, Bruno 
Coppieters, a Eurasian studies expert, observes that “Georgia is a weak state in a 
fragmented region,”48 and he describes Georgia as striving to “resist its peripheral status 
vis-à-vis Moscow by claiming membership in Western organizations. It strives for a change 
of status from dependency on a single center (Moscow) toward interdependency with a 
multi-tiered network of centers within a larger Euro-Atlantic environment.”49 This 
gravitation towards the West is deeply unsettling to many Abkhaz, who maintain strong ties 
with Russia, which is hostile to NATO’s continuing encroachment toward its borders.  
The Georgian state’s relative weakness, along with rash decisions by Saakashvili, 
contributed seriously to the outbreak of hostilities. A more seasoned politician might have 
seen the writing on the wall, and understood that using the Georgian military to regain 
South Ossetia was a sizable risk. Thus, Saakashvili was at times his own worst enemy in 
preventing himself from realizing any significant breakthroughs on the peace/reintegration 
process with the separatist republics. Instead, given the Russian support of the republics, 
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and a relatively weak power broker in Tbilisi, the separatists were less likely to attempt 
negotiations in good faith,50 because they could easily rely on their Russian protector. 
 
Abkhazia 
On June 7th, 2008, I conducted a two-hour interview in Berlin with a senior member 
of the Heinrich Böll Foundation,51 a German Green Party-affiliated foundation that 
promotes democracy and cross-cultural understanding. The gentleman with whom I was 
meeting preferred to speak off the record, due to the ongoing second-track negotiations he 
was with which he as involved. Speaking from over a decade of experience in the Caucasus, 
he explained that Abkhazia, unlike any other separatist movement in the former Soviet or 
Yugoslav sphere, has actually succeeded in building a working government and a decent 
civil society. This success was achieved in spite of the loss of a quarter of a million people 
following the civil war in the early 1990s. Such success might indicated why Freedom 
House gives Abkhazia a rating of “partly free,” just like Georgia, with scores that are only 
slightly behind its much larger neighbor.52 
The Heinrich Böll official contrasted Abkhazia to Kosovo, which he argued was 
essentially run by the mafia, and the West’s support of Kosovo’s independence thus enabled 
such criminality. He also outlined the other so-called “frozen conflicts,” in comparison with 
Abkhazia: Moldova’s Transdniestria, hopelessly corrupt and incredibly dependent on 
Russia; South Ossetia, far too small and poor to ever be independent, which is why many of 
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the key figures in its government are Russian nationals; finally, Nagorno-Karabakh, the 
claimed Armenian exclave within Azerbaijan, a much bloodier history here, and Azerbaijan 
is markedly less free than either Georgia or Abkhazia. 
The official detailed that the Abkhaz desired complete independence, not Russian 
domination, and he pointed to the Abkhazian election of Sergei Bagapsh in 2004, over the 
heavily Kremlin-backed Raul Khadjimba, as proof of their independent streak. 
Nevertheless, Abkhazia is not nearly as independent as it might like to be. It remains highly 
dependent on Russian largesse, whether consumer goods, expertise, and weaponry. An ideal 
case in point is the Russian “passportizing” of the Abkhazian people, the practice by which 
Russia grants passports to all Abkhazians, and then claiming the right to protect its citizens. 
Of course, Russia chose to do this as retaliation for the ongoing Georgian blockade of 
Abkhazia, and the fact that Abkhaz are allowed extremely limited movement outside of 
their own territory.  
Abkhazia’s governmental structure divides power between a president and a 
parliament equally, in theory, but in practice, much like Georgia, the president exercises 
extensive control. The president and vice president are elected for five-year terms. The 
parliament, or People’s Assembly, consists of 35 members elected for five-year terms from 
single-seat constituencies, much like Georgia’s system. 53 Despite the presence of 
democratic institutions, and the several elections that have taken place so far, the Abkhazian 
government is rife with corruption, as well as a kind of parochialism that results in the old 
patronage networks being preserved, all the while the Georgian leadership is doing its best 
to dismantle such patronage networks within its own borders. 
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Abkhazia is as yet unable to stand on its own. Because it prefers Russia to its 
erstwhile confederate partner, Georgia, and because the Abkhazian state itself is a weakly 
functioning institution, the seeds were sown for any Georgian military provocation to result 
in a massive Russian invasion, and the occupation of Abkhazia, if only to ensure the safety 
of the “Russian” citizens there. Russia’s role within the region must now be examined, in 
order to gain an understanding of this resurgent power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
RUSSIA – THE KEY PLAYER AND MOST CRITICAL FACTOR 
Russia is without question the most important factor shaping Georgia and Abkhazia; 
Georgia’s independence in 1991 did little to throw off almost two hundred years of 
domination by its powerful northern neighbor. The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated 
a tremendous crisis of identity within Russia itself. This crisis featured some of the more 
nationalistic Russian leadership viewing the demise of the Soviet Union as a form of 
liberation for Mother Russia, while others lamented the loss of superpower status. In any 
case, the poverty-stricken, civil war-wracked Russia of the 1990s bears little resemblance to 
the oil profits-engorged, autocratically consolidated, assertive Russia of today. 
This chapter will discuss Russia’s role in the Caucasus in regards to the conflict 
between Georgia and Abkhazia within the past two decades. Where chapter 1 outlined the 
approach taken by the various Soviet governments to the region, this chapter shall analyze 
the post-Soviet Russian approach. However, there has never been a clear distinction 
between Soviet and Russian involvement in the Georgian-Abkhazia conflict.54 This lack of 
a distinction creates a series of problems, not least of which is an absence of a change in 
policy in the Caucasus. In fact, as the Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin observes, Russia has 
essentially no coherent foreign policy in the Caucasus.55 This is due partially to the fact that 
until Putin’s consolidation of the Russian state, beginning in 2000, there were at least six 
competing centers of foreign policy influence within Russia. These were: 
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1. Boris Yeltsin and the Russian executive branch 
2. The Foreign Ministry 
3. Gazprom, Lukoil, and Transneft, as well as other energy conglomerates affiliated 
with former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin 
4. The Defense Ministry 
5. The Atomic Energy Ministry 
6. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations56 
 
However, even in the face of such a multitude of actors, Bruno Coppieters argues 
that,  
 
the various foreign policy players on the Russian domestic scene share, despite 
the variety of their actual policies, common geopolitical and geo-economic interests 
or at least have to take these general interests into consideration when attempting to 
influence Russian policies. It is, therefore, possible to speak of Russian position, even 
if various actors on the Russian domestic scene pursue their own particular foreign 
policy agendas.57 
 
 Thus we may hypothesize that the often contradictory and haphazard Russian 
foreign policy nevertheless has an element of consistency to it.  Putin’s consolidation of 
power, which enables him to more effectively wield the state apparatus, has proven this 
theory, as now all of these formerly competing interests now look to the Kremlin.58 Why 
then is Russia’s foreign policy in its “near abroad” still so contradictory and incoherent? I 
will argue that Russian foreign policy is quite rational, if poorly implemented, especially 
when one considers their strategic interests and constraints. 
I will also outline Russia’s rationale for recognizing Abkhazia on August 26th and 
discuss the steps the Russian government has taken to increase its influence. From 
increasing the number of “peacekeepers” to offering generous deals in terms of goods and 
resources, Russia has established itself as the central motivator for the development of this 
conflict, and the most vital actor to involve in negotiating any outcome.  
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Strategically speaking, Russia faces serious challenges in the Caucasus, which 
account for its often controversial and contradictory foreign policy. In formulating this 
foreign policy in the immediate post-Soviet era, Russia assumed that if its southern 
neighbors, Georgia and Azerbaijan, were allowed to have their own way, they would try and 
conduct a sovereign foreign policy and look for alternative partners and alliances rather than 
choosing to partner exclusively with Russia. Russia found such an outcome unacceptable, 
and thus began to take steps to reassert control over the Southern Caucasus.59 
Russia’s strategy towards Georgia specifically tended to play Georgia and its 
separatist regions (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and, before Saakashvili brought it back into the 
fold, Adjara) off one another, a tendency that Russia continues into the present day. It is no 
coincidence that Russian peacekeepers have been present in the region for over 14 years,60  
and yet have made no concrete contribution to peace other than preventing the outbreak of 
full-scale war. I will argue that Russia views preserving the status quo as ultimately 
preferable to any kind of a resolution to the conflict.  
Traditionally Georgia has always looked to the West, even while its history is a 
thoroughly Caucasian one.61  Azerbaijan on the other hand saw its independence as a chance 
to establish a close partnership with (Muslim) Turkey as well as Western oil companies like 
BP and ExxonMobil. Russia’s options for dealing with such wayward trajectories in the 
1990s were few, because it was still far too weak and internally divided to attract its former 
constituent states. Only a sizable military presence would guarantee clout in the region, but 
Russia was grappling with so many internal problems that projecting that kind of military 
                                                 
59
 Cornell 18-19 
 
60
 Antonenko 220-221 
 
61
 Goltz 27 
   29 
power appeared untenable.62 Therefore, it appears that Russia concluded that the most 
efficient way to maintain influence throughout the Caucasus would be through meddling in 
the ongoing conflicts there, in order to exacerbate their internal difficulties. If these 
countries themselves were struggling with conflicts, then they might have to rely on 
Russia’s assistance, whether mediation, intervention, or otherwise.  
Svante Cornell, author of a comprehensive evaluation of the challenges facing a 
post-Rose Revolution Georgia, remarks that, “the evolution of Russian policy in the former 
Soviet space is relatively clear. From 1999 onwards, Putin’s Russia increasingly has moved 
in a nationalistic direction, and sought to prevent Western encroachment in what it views as 
its backyard.”63 He expands this idea further, stating,  
Moscow blatantly has interfered in the internal affairs of these countries, utilizing 
their economic dependence on Russia and manipulated territorial conflicts to undermine the 
stability, independent policy formulation, and development of these countries. The purpose 
of the policy seems obvious: to maintain the dependence of the CIS countries on Russia, 
making Russia the primary and ideally sole arbiter in the international politics of Eurasia.64 
 
Russia thus became a kind of provocateur to the various conflicts in the region: 
Transdniestria, the Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, etc.65 Russia’s 
primary mode of expressing this influence was naturally the sizable military presence left 
over from the Red Army in the Caucasus. Before Putin’s consolidation, the Russian military 
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had a tremendous degree of political power, and was instrumental in shaping policy in the 
near abroad.66 
Of course, Russia had very practical reasons for attempting to reassert control over 
its periphery. The northern Caucasus is part of Russia, and the oblasts of Karachaevo-
Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and of course, 
Chechnya, all have been jostling to one degree or another for greater autonomy, or even 
independence.67 However, Russia’s involvement in the Georgia-Abkhazia war of the early 
1990s, and Russia was heavily involved, would appear to be contrary to Russian interests. 
After all, although Russia initially supported Georgian territorial integrity (looking to its 
own ethnically fractious Caucasus), Russia soon shifted to heavy support for the Abkhaz 
insurrection: arms, equipment, logistics, soldiers, irregulars, even officers were dispatched 
to help Abkhazia break away from Georgia.68  
How could Russia make the case that it supported the right of a people to self-
determination in one instance, on a neighbor’s territory, and in another, a few hundred 
kilometers away, that principle had vanished? They did it ingeniously. The Russian generals 
who co-opted Russia into the war were responding to the threat from within the Caucasus 
that if Russia didn’t stick up for the Abkhaz, then, according to the leader of the 
Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus,69 the various peoples would begin to follow 
the Chechen strategy and seek independence with guns. So for once, self-determination was 
a single-edged sword. 
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The 1992-1993 war in Abkhazia coincided with a sharp polarization within the 
Russian political elites, the “democrats” led by Yeltsin on one side, and the neo-communists 
and nationalists on the other. Thus, the conflict in Abkhazia became highly politicized. 
Generally speaking, Yeltsin’s side supported Shevardnadze’s government, that is, they 
recognized Georgia’s territorial integrity in principle, and on the other hand, the 
communists/nationalists openly supported the Abkhaz and called for Russia to annex 
Abkhazia.70  
The opposition nationalists/communists backed the Abkhaz openly and consistently 
while the government was practically incoherent. This led to Yeltsin doing very little to 
keep his military in Abkhazia in check; although he would occasionally voice a vague 
statement of support for the “territorial integrity of Georgia.”71 The simple fact that both 
sides in the Abkhaz war, as well as all the sides in all the Caucasian wars, were supplied 
with arms from the Russian military can be explained by the fact that the Russians wanted 
to keep the war going because of their goal to destabilize neighbors to keep them weak and 
in check, along with the fact that they could not stop the lucrative arms trade which enriched 
the military,72  
However, since Putin’s election almost nine years ago, Russia has been far more 
assertive, both on the world stage and around its periphery. Despite Medvedev’s election 
this past spring, there is no question as to who is really in charge of Russia. One of Putin’s 
most “effective” reforms was essentially the abolishment of Russian federalism by reigning 
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in the regions.73 Putin dismantled the old Soviet ties to faraway states like Cuba and 
Vietnam, preferring to focus resources on the near abroad.74 With that refocusing complete, 
Putin began using the Russian state in ways that were all too familiar to Soviet Union 
oppression. After Georgia arrested four Russian officers on suspicion of spying,  
Moscow broadened this to a full embargo, banning all transport and postage links 
with Georgia as well as trade. Flush with petrodollars, Moscow has poured millions 
of dollars into anti-government media and political figures in Georgia, … Moscow 
has turned to pogrom-like harassment of ethnic Georgians living in Russia, closing 
down shops and restaurants and deporting ordinary people. Most worrisome has 
been the Russian government’s decision to force Russian schools to register and 
report all children  with Georgian surnames, a blatant and obviously unconstitutional 
form of ethnic discrimination.75 
 
 
Russia’s strategy is remarkably simple: keep everyone off balance, so that Russia is 
needed as a peacekeeper, as a mediator, and as a partner. Russia is terrified of the countries 
on its periphery going their own ways, because in all likelihood, virtually all of them would 
drift westwards quickly. Thus, Russia is forced to adapt and utilize a strategy that in the 
short term makes its neighbors do its bidding, but over the long term I believe it is pushing 
its neighbors further and further away. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE REFUGEE AND DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTION 
This chapter will argue that because of the continuing ethnic tensions within Georgia 
and among the separatist republics, the likelihood of an ethnic conflict, and the lack of a 
speedy resolution to it, were quite likely. This chapter will concisely examine the two main 
components to the question of refugees and demographics in Georgia-Abkhazia: first, the 
issue of Internally Displaced Persons, and second, the demographic shift that took Abkhazia 
from a small number of Abkhaz before the civil war to a sizable plurality today. 
Internally Displaced Persons 
First, the thorny and oft-overlooked (at least, outside of Georgia) issue of the quarter 
of a million displaced persons who fled Abkhazia following the conclusion of the Georgia-
Abkhazia War in 1993.76 Having fled eastwards to Georgia, these IDPs (Internally 
Displaced Persons, as the UN calls them) are a loud and powerful voting bloc, and maintain 
a militant view on solutions to the separatist issue, because of the fact that tens of thousands 
of ethnic Georgians were killed in ethnic cleansing by the Abkhaz separatists during the 
1992-1993 war. Many want to go home, but absolutely refuse to live under Abkhaz rule. 
Many no longer wish to return, they simply desire suitable compensation for what they lost. 
Any solution to the conflict necessarily must take the IDPs and their property claims into 
serious consideration, because when they were forced to flee, many left everything behind; 
houses, cars, valuables, all appropriated by neighbors and the irregulars that came into 
Abkhazia to fight. 
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They have been living as IDPs for approximately 14 years now, just as 250,000 
people is a tremendous number in a country of only 4.5 million. The IDPs tend to take a 
very hard line approach to the separatist republics of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia,77 
and their decades-long agitation to “do something” about the stalemate likely contributed to 
the present predicament by causing Saakashvili to overplay his hand, just as their lack of 
searching for a compromise has doomed them to the status of internally displaced persons.  
The next section discusses this in greater depth, but there is little reason to suppose 
that Abkhazia would willingly drown itself by welcoming back a quarter of a million 
Georgians, especially when the memory of “the burning by the Georgian military of the 
Abkhazian State Archive and the Abkhazian Institute of Language, Literature and History 
and the desecration of memorials to Abkhazian writers and educators,”78 still lingers on.  
 
The demographic shift in Abkhazia 
Prior to the flight of those 250,000 ethnic Georgian refugees, Abkhazia was home to 
a scarce 18% ethnic Abkhaz population; the majority population was ethnically Georgian.79 
Recall in chapter 1 the discussion of Beria’s forced resettlement into Abkhazia of 
foreigners; that action was designed for just such an outcome: the Abkhaz as a minority on 
their own land. Were even a small fraction of the Georgian IDPs to actually return, 
Abkhazia would quickly become a territory with at least a plurality of ethnic Georgians, 
which for many Abkhaz represents a daunting apartheid-like situation. After Russian 
annexation, tens of thousands of Abkhaz fled the ancestral homeland (fearing persecution 
                                                 
77
 Antonenko 221-226 
 
78
 Akaba  86. 
79
 Conciliation Resources Online, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/chronology.php> 
   35 
for their Islamic faith) for the Ottoman Empire, resulting in a vacuum in Abkhazia that was 
filled by immigrants from within the Russian Empire, mostly Caucasian in-migration, and 
mostly Georgian.80 
Given Russian recognition of Abkhazia as an independent state, Abkhazia is now 
refusing to allow more Georgian refugees to return home, because Abkhazia recognizes that 
without proper constitutional safeguards admitting more refugees would be inept. Abkhazia 
thus clearly has a strong incentive for keeping the refugees out, despite the legitimate claims 
of many of them who want to return home. This incentive without question causes Abkhazia 
to drift closer towards Russia and Russian protection, and for that reason, this particular 
factor certainly impacted the Abkhazian decision-making process at the outset of hostilities. 
At the 1989 Soviet census, Abkhazia was only 18% ethnically Abkhaz; clearly there 
is no desire to return to the previous status quo. Thus the demographics of Abkhazia now 
represent an aberration in the past two centuries of Abkhazia’s history. The graph on the 
next page illustrates the demographics over the course of a century up to the “present” of 
1989, when the last Soviet census was completed. Since that time, Abkhazia has witnessed a 
sea change in its demography, moving from a very multiethnic society to one in which it 
appears that the ethnic Abkhaz are trying to create their own nation state. 81 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even without the quarter million refugees, Abkhazia is still ethnically divided 
among Abkhaz, Mingrelians, Greeks, Armenians, and others. Reconciling these competing 
interests will have a profound impact on any settlement. As an ethnically heterogeneous 
territory with an unclear system of power-sharing between the Greeks, Armenians, Abkhaz, 
it is still unclear what power-sharing mechanisms would protect the “new” minorities, 
especially given the fact that Abkhaz separatists ethnically cleansed communities of 
Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, and even Russians during the civil war in the 1990s.82 
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Accurate modern demographic data for Abkhazia is difficult to come by, but a 2003 
disputed census indicates that the Abkhaz have a plurality of approximately 44%, Georgians 
are second at 21%, Armenians third with 21%, Russians at 11%, and Greeks with less than 
1%.83 As stated, the Russian-operated census is disputed, but the general figures are 
probably close.  
Thus I believe that the ethnic tensions on the ground, inspiring animosity and 
distrust for the Other, have played an important role in getting us to the situation that the 
South Caucasus is in today, because it is very easy for Russia to exploit the already present 
animosity between the two sides, and thus it’s likely that the new Russian tanks will be 
based in the separatist republics indefinitely. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE AUGUST WAR AND CONCLUSION 
 
Where a few months ago the West was by and large disinterested in the conflict, 
recent events and great power politics have led to a great deal more interest in this “quarrel 
in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing,” to borrow 
Chamberlain’s line.   
Although it is certainly not the case that the West hasn’t been involved in attempting 
to mediate the conflict, for that would be disrespecting the efforts of capable diplomats, 
NGOs, and the UN and OSCE monitors, the fact is that until the war broke out in August, 
the West was largely disinterested in the “frozen conflicts.” President Saakashvili and 
President Bush enjoy a friendship, but there was no engagement in Georgia, by way of the 
U.S.A. or the EU that would indicate it was an important strategic interest. Instead, it 
appears to me that both the EU and the U.S. have been deferring to Russia’s whims when it 
comes to the former Soviet sphere of influence, which I would argue was a dangerous path 
to walk. For better or for worse, Russia’s actions in Georgia this past summer have gotten it 
a great deal of attention. 
Regardless, on August 7th, 2008, a couple days into the Olympics, war broke out in 
the Caucasus. Within a week, most of the main fighting was concluded, President Nicolas 
Sarkozy having negotiated a ceasefire. That is about all that everyone can agree upon. 
Georgia and Russia give staggeringly different accounts of the events during that week in 
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August, as well as different accounts of the months leading up to the outbreak of violence. 
What is generally agreed upon, however, is this: 
Throughout 2008, tensions were steadily escalating between Georgia and Russia, 
especially following the West’s recognition of Kosovo against Russia’s wishes. Georgia 
accused Russia several times of flagrant violations of its sovereignty, as well as attacking 
several of its unmanned airplanes. A UN report concluded in May that a Russian fighter 
plane had indeed shot down a Georgian UAV. Tit for tat rocket attacks occurred throughout 
June, July, and the first few days of August, but the West did nothing substantial to 
intervene, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (read: Russian) peacekeepers took 
no actions to halt the shelling.  
Late at night on August 7th, 2008, Georgia launched a ground and air based assault 
on South Ossetia's capital of Tskhinvali. Russia responded almost instantly by invading 
Georgia proper, flooding South Ossetia with troops and bombing targets farther into 
Georgia. What started as an incident in South Ossetia quickly morphed into what can be 
considered Russia’s desire to complete break the Georgian warfighting capability. What 
angered most observers was the vastly disproportionate response to Georgian provocation 
given by Russia. In the ensuing weeks, Russia drove Georgians entirely out of the separatist 
republics, and Russia soldiers maintained their hold on some of the smaller towns that were 
well outside of the separatist republic’s jurisdiction. At present an uneasy impasse exists, 
while irregular violence occurs all too frequently along the borders of the separatist 
republics. Russia recognized the republics as sovereign states towards the end of August, 
sparking another round of displeased discourse among Western capitals. 
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Although Russia halted its attack months ago, Russian forces continue to occupy 
parts of Georgia that they are not supposed to be on. Russia has failed to satisfy its stated 
obligations in the cease-fire agreement signed by Russian President Medvedev. Russia’s 
recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, taken immediately after cessation 
of hostilities and as the conflict’s embers were still smoldering, suggests that Russian  aims 
toward Georgia were not limited to merely restoring the prewar status quo, but rather, their 
aims were making a substantial adjustment in their near abroad. 
Nevertheless, at present a strange stalemate exists between those countries. In order 
to better understand the dynamics at play here, I interviewed several ranking diplomats to 
get their take on the development of the crisis.  
For this chapter, I interviewed the Georgian ambassador to Austria and the OSCE, 
Ilja Giorgadze; a very senior American diplomat affiliated with NATO; and a midlevel 
Russian diplomat, both of whom preferred speaking on condition of anonymity. 
On October 28th I met with the Georgian ambassador to Austria and the OSCE, and 
we discussed the August war, the aftermath, and Georgia’s prospects in the near future. The 
most interesting thing that Ambassador Giorgadze discussed was an argument that the 
conflict did not begin on August 7th, but had rather started months ago when Russia 
increased its cross-border shelling and shot down Georgian planes. I found this line of 
argument compelling, especially since the UN has released a document concluding that it 
was indeed a Russian plane.84  
Of course, the Russian diplomat I met with told me the total opposite, that this was 
an unprovoked attack on South Ossetia, and Russian peacekeepers were endangered, and 
thus Russia had to go into South Ossetia to guarantee their security. When I asked him why 
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Abkhazia, too, he responded that Russia had to be sure Georgia would not try anything over 
there, either. Clearly there is a profound need for an independent commission to figure out 
what exactly went on in Georgia a few months ago. The New York Times reported on 
November 7th, 2008, that perhaps Georgia’s version of events did not stack up again the 
forensic evidence.85 
 When I discussed this possibility with the senior American diplomat, his response 
was, “so what?” and he proceeded to tell me that the far more important question is not how 
many mortars Georgia lobbed into its own territory, but rather, was the Russian response 
grossly disproportionate? Does Georgia have a right, as a sovereign country, to determine 
whether it wants to become part of NATO or not? The diplomat also explained the U.S.’s 
thoughts on Georgia becoming part of NATO: that NATO will be there for Georgia when 
Georgia is ready.  
All three gentlemen were positive about working with either American presidential 
candidate, and all agreed that whether Obama or McCain won, dealing with the “frozen 
conflicts” ought to be a significant point on his agenda, although their opinions on NATO 
expansion differed significantly. 
I would like to conclude by stating that I believe that the events of this summer have 
made it next to impossible that Abkhazia would choose of its own free will to become a part 
of Georgia again in the foreseeable future. The Russian recognition of Abkhazia on the 
other hand has made it more difficult for Europe to become directly involved with Abkhaz 
and South Ossetians diplomatically, though in order to be a broker, that is vital. There need 
to be direct talks with the officials involved, and not just between Russia and Georgia; the 
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Europeans (and maybe the Turks or the UN) seem to be the only possible mediator of such 
talks.  
I do not see Abkhazia returning to the Georgian fold any time soon, but an 
unexpectedly overzealous event or action taken by Russia could open the door to either 
asymmetric federation (Abkhazia could have great autonomy, like a German Land, but is 
subordinate to united Georgia in questions of treaties, etc.) or a Swiss-style confederation. 
Saakashvili’s unitary government is untenable at best.  
The problem is that in order for any negotiations to be successful, one needs some 
amount of confidence building on both sides, both of whom feel an essential/existential 
threat (Georgians from Russia, and Abkhaz from Georgia). But to achieve that, the events of 
this summer have set progress back some years. So long term involvement and facilitation 
of confidence building measures might be one possible step for Europe to take. 
Above all, there needs to be clarification of what happened during the first two hours 
of the conflict. This is still completely unclear, and all sides are creating their own histories 
of that crucial time, reinforcing their stories of victimhood. I would recommend an 
independent UN task force to look into this. 
At the beginning of this thesis I asked the question “how did we get here?” and I 
explained that there were several factors that have resulted in the present stalemate in the 
Caucasus. First, the long history of distrust and jockeying for power that exists between the 
Georgians and the Abkhaz. Second, the weak state institutions on both sides do not lend 
themselves to solving big problems. Third, Russia is reasserting its hegemony in the region, 
and is back to being as interventionist as it ever has been. Fourth, the difficult question of 
what to do about the refugees and how to respect the Abkhaz desire to have favorable 
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demographics. These four factors are intertwined, and together they created a rather perfect 
storm for this conflict to break out in, which is to say that without any progress towards 
ameliorating any of these factors, I believe that the conflict we witnessed this summer was 
inevitable. So, in that sense, Georgia and Abkhazia wound up where they are now as a result 
of consistently making decisions not to engage one another, not to try and compromise, not 
to seek consensus; instead they are both effectively under the thumb of Russia because they 
viewed their conflict as a zero-sum game: if some Georgian refugees come home to 
Abkhazia, then that must mean that the local Abkhaz lose.  
Such a mode of thinking is a real shame, and represents a tremendously squandered 
opportunity. I can only hope that Moldovans and Transdniestrians, Ukrainians and 
Crimeans, and Azeris and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, have all been watching this 
conflict and how it has played out very carefully.  
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